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Paul Riley* Proportionality as a Guiding
Principle in Young Offender
Dispositions
In its approach to criminal activity by young persons, and in particular to
sentencing, the purpose of the Young Offenders Act was to move away from a
"reatmentmodel"ofjuvenile criminallawtowarda model which would hold young
persons criminally accountable in much the same way as adults are accountable.
The author examines sentencing practice under the Young Offenders Act and
concludes that this goal has not been achieved. Courts continue to employ
aspects of the "treatmentmodel", leading to erratic sentencing andin many cases
to the imposition of sentences that are more severe than if the young persons
were treated as adults. The author examines possible reforms which would
ensure that sentencing practice under the Young Offenders Act would accord
more closely with its original purpose.
Sentencing is traditionally regarded as one of the most difficult and
challenging functions of the criminal justice system. In arriving at the
appropriate sanction to be imposed upon an offender, a court must
reconcile the principles and objectives of the criminal law with the
criminal act committed, the circumstances surrounding its commission,
and the character of the offender who committed it. The court must, with
the guidance of a few abstract, broadly philosophical, and often contra-
dictory principles of sentencing, decide upon a sanction which is appro-
priate in the very concrete and factually specific case within which it is
presented. This onerous task is even more difficult when the particular
offender is a young person whose understanding of responsibility is less
than complete, whose character has yet to be fully developed, and whose
need for guidance is consequently greater than that of an adult offender.
It is clear that there are special circumstances to be considered when
sentencing young offenders. Unfortunately, an examination of current
young offender legislation in Canada reveals that these special consider-
ations are being used to justify a greater degree of state interference in
dealing with young offenders than law and morality would permit in the
adult context. In short the Young Offenders Act' is being interpreted and
applied so as to permit an interventionist approach to sentencing young
people.
* LL.B. expected, 1995,Dalhousie University. The author was awarded aJ.S.D. Tory Writing
Award for this paper.
1. R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1 [hereinafter YOA].
Proportionality as a Guiding Principle in Young Offender Dispositions
This paper advances the argument that the state has no greater right to
interfere with the liberty of young people who commit criminal acts than
it does in respect of adult criminals. The only morally permissible basis
for state intervention should be the culpability of the offender and the
criminal act committed by that offender. A criminal sanction has just as
significant an impact on the liberty of a young person as it would have on
an adult.
This paper is divided into four parts. The first will show the historical
development of sentencing philosophy in juvenile criminal law in Canada
and other jurisdictions in North America. The second part will outline
briefly the sentencing provisions of the current legislative r6gime in
Canada, the YOA. The third part will consider how courts have used
traditional objectives of adult sentencing in determining young offender
dispositions. The fourth and final part of the paper will attempt to outline
some possible reforms to the sentencing philosophy of the YOA in light
of the approaches adopted in some American jurisdictions.
I. The Evolution of Sentencing Philosophy in
Juvenile Criminal Law
Historically, the common law made little accommodation for the young
offender. According to the maxim of doli incapax, a general incapacity
for criminal conduct, children under the age of seven were not subject to
criminal law. For children between the ages of seven and thirteen there
was a presumption of criminal incapacity which could be rebutted
depending on the level of development and culpability of the particular
child. Children over the age of thirteen were subject to the full rigours of
the criminal law.2 The 1892 version of the Criminal Code3 provided for
a different mode of trial for young persons, one without publicity. There
was, however, no differentiation between adult and young offenders in
terms of sentencing.
The Criminal Code is generally considered to be based on a justice
philosophy in which the justification for state restriction of the freedom
and liberty of the offender is the offence which has been committed.
Sentencing under the Criminal Code is thus governed by an overriding
concern for proportionality: the penal sanction must be proportionate to
the sum of the moral blameworthiness of the offender's act and the
consequences which result from that act. Any other objectives of sentenc-
2. N. Bala, "The Young Offenders Act: A Legal Framework" in J. Hudson, J. Homick & B.
Burrows, eds., Justice andthe Young Offender in Canada, (Toronto: Wall & Thompson, 1988)
11 at 11.
3. S.C. 1892, c. 29.
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ing, such as efforts to rehabilitate the individual or to deter the individual
or others, must be accommodated within the range of punishments
dictated by the principle of proportionality. Each offence has a specified
maximum penalty and some offences have specified minima as well.
Some writers would describe sentencing philosophy under the Criminal
Code as offence oriented.4
Since the introduction of the Juvenile Delinquents Act in 1908,1 it has
been recognized in Canada that principles of sentencing applied to adult
offenders were not wholly appropriate for young offenders. The approach
under the JDA was largely paternalistic. When a child showed signs of
serious delinquency, which may or may not have meant that the child had
actually broken the law, 6 the state saw fit to intervene and assume the role
of raising the child. Provincial social welfare institutions consequently
served as a form of substitute family for the delinquent.
7
The JDA has been characterized variously as a positivist model, a
treatment model, and a welfare model.8 The statute was predicated on the
belief that the young offender had not chosen to do wrong, but had learned
to do wrong as a result of the environment in which he or she had been
reared. Thus, while the Criminal Code was based on a philosophy that
saw crime as a chosen course of action which was to be punished, the JDA
saw crime as a condition or sickness which was to be treated.9 The JDA
approached sentencing from a markedly different perspective than that
taken under the general criminal law. Dispositions under the JDA were
determined almost entirely on the basis of the needs of the individual
offender, having regard to how that person could best be rehabilitated. It
was believed that legislation could not adequately account for all the
concerns of the individual delinquent. Consequently the legislation
afforded virtually unlimited discretion to judges in determining disposi-
tions. Removing the discretion from the trial judge would hamper the
ability of that judge to arrive at the disposition which would most benefit
the juvenile.
4. See e.g. J. Tr6panier, "Principles and Goals Guiding the Choice of Dispositions under the
YOA"inL. Beaulieu, ed., Young OffenderDispositions (Toronto: Wall & Emerson, 1989) 27.
5. S.C. 1908, c. 40.
6. See Juvenile Delinquents Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. J-3 [hereinafter JDA]. The offence of
"delinquency" is defined in section 3(1) of the JDA as being the commission of any of the acts
of a "juvenile delinquent". A "juvenile delinquent" is defined broadly in section 2 to include,
among other things, a child who is guilty of any "form of vice", or a child who has been
designated a delinquent by any other legislation, provincial or federal.
7. JDA, s. 20(1).
8. J. Hudson, J. Honick & B. Burrows, "Introduction" inJ. Hudson, J. Hornick & B. Burrows,
eds., supra note 2, 2 at 4.
9. JDA, s. 3(2).
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The JDA provided for "a significant variety of dispositions. These
ranged from doing virtually nothing... to doing almost anything...."-0
A central dispositional feature of the JDA was the indeterminate sen-
tence. It was seen as an invaluable tool in dealing with juvenile delin-
quents because it permitted the state to maintain control over the child for
as long as was deemed necessary to ensure reform and rehabilitation, but
no longer. It became apparent, however, that institutionalization of young
persons was not a wholly effective means of rehabilitation. Moreover,
indeterminate sentences failed to recognize the rights of either the child
or the child's parents. A child found to be delinquent in some minor way
could be institutionalized and, upon responding poorly to "treatment" in
a custodial facility, might be held for the duration of his or her years as
a minor. The JDA has been seriously criticized for its failure to acknowl-
edge and respect the rights of the young offender.
It is widely accepted that the introduction of the YOA" in 1983
represented a shift in the philosophy of juvenile penal law.12 As seen
above, the JDA had been criticized for its failure to respect the rights of
the young person, both during the process of determining guilt and in the
consequences of a finding of guilt. The YOA was an attempt to move
closer to a justice-oriented model: there was a greater emphasis on the
rights and concomitant responsibilities of the young offender. Within the
YOA itself, the Declaration of Principle is indicative of the transition: s. 3
makes reference to such concepts as accountability, responsibility, the
rights of the young person, and protection of society.
It must be acknowledged, however, that the YOA is not a "mini-
Criminal Code". 3 The YOA makes it clear that young offenders are not
to be held accountable to the same extent as adults. The implication is that
while young persons are responsible for their acts, their understanding of
responsibility is circumscribed in light of their limited experience and
maturity. The reference to "limited accountability" in s. 3 of the YOA is
probably an acknowledgement that there should be some leniency and
understanding with respect to the wrongdoing of a young person. Whether
this concept is actually employed in handing down dispositions is another
matter.14 There is also reference to the dependency, level of development,
10. T. Caputo and D. Bracken, "Custodial Dispositions and the Young Offenders Act" in J.
Hudson, J. Homick & B. Burrows, eds., supra note 2, 123 at 124.
11. S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 110.
12. R. Corrado and A. Markwart, "The Prices of Rights and Responsibilities" (1988) 7 Can.
J. Far. L. 93. See also Caputo and Bracken, supra note 10.
13. See e.g. C. Manfredi, "The Young Offenders Act and Juvenile Justice in the United
States" (1991) 6 Can. J.L. & Society 45 at 49.
14. Bala, supra note 2, 11 at2l.
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and special needs of young persons. Young persons are impressionable,
lack experience and education, and thus are in need of guidance. The YOA
implicitly acknowledges that the state has a higher level of responsibility
in dealing with young offenders than it does in the adult context.
The YOA, as a result, is a mixed model of juvenile penal law incorpo-
rating elements of each of the two extremes embodied by the Criminal
Code and the JDA. The Supreme Court of Canada described the YOA in
the following manner:
[Tihe Act should be seen as part of a spectrum of legislation from those
statutes that provide welfare care for children at one end to the strict
sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code at the other.15
It is noteworthy that, while the Criminal Code specifies a maximum for
each offence named, custodial dispositions under the YOA are not tied to
substantive crimes with the exception of those punishable by life impris-
onment under the Criminal Code. This distinction has been used by some
writers to support the proposition that the YOA is offender-oriented.'
6
Manfredi points to the similarities between the development of juve-
nile penal philosophy in Canada and the experience of state legislators in
the United States.17 The initial impetus for the move from a treatment to
ajustice perspective is reflected in a line of United States Supreme Court
decisions respecting the rights of young persons within criminal proce-
dure. Landmark decisions in Re Gault,Is Kent v. United States,19 and Re
Winship2' affirmed the procedural rights of young offenders, but in the
view of commentators such as Sarri had little impact on the dispositional
practices of state juvenile penal systems. In Sarri's view, dispositions in
most American jurisdictions are not governed by any clear criteria.
2 1
Both Manfredi and Schneider2 2 assert that the philosophy of state
juvenile justice systems is moving closer to the philosophy used in adult
criminal law. Manfredi points to legislation in Michigan, New York, and
Washington that has been "criminalized" in a number of ways, two of
which impact directly on dispositional practices. First, substantive changes
15. R. v.M.(J.J.), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 421 at427 [hereinafter J.J.M.].
16. J.P. Brodeur, "Some Comments on Sentencing Guidelines" in L. Beaulieu, ed., supra
note 4, 107 at 113.
17. Supra note 13.
18. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
19. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
20. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
21. R. Sarri, "Detention and Alternatives in the United States Since the Gault Decision" in
R. Corrado, M. LeBlanc & J. Trdpanier, eds., Current Issues in Juvenile Justice (Toronto:
Butterworth, 1983) 315.
22. A. Schneider and D. Schram, "The Washington State Juvenile Justice System Reform:
A Review of the Findings" (1986) 1 Criminal Justice Policy Review 211.
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to dispositional provisions have been implemented in a move from an
offender-oriented to an offence-oriented system of sentencing. Manfredi
describes the process as an
attempt to create a more direct link between the substance of dispositions
and specific acts. The impetus for this development has been two-fold:
(1) the desire to control discretionary decision making and dispositional
discrepancy; and (2) the realization that the failure to establish a relation-
ship between acts and their consequences undermines the deterrent value
of juvenile court intervention.
23
Secondly, declarations of principle have been included in a number of
new state enactments. Such declarations generally acknowledge the
rights of the young offender in a comprehensive way and, in Manfredi's
opinion, go further in guaranteeing fairness or "justice" in dispositional
practice than do sporadic decisions of the United States Supreme Court. 4
Manfredi views the merging of juvenile and adult penal philosophy as
a progressive trend, since it is based on the proposition that the only
justification for state intervention is the commission of an offence. There
is a great deal of support for the view that a gradual shift in the philosophy
of young offender sentencing is occurring across North America. Simply
put, the overall sentencing philosophy in young offender legislation is
moving ever closer to the traditional adult philosophy. Viewed in this
context, it is submitted that Parliament's transition from the JDA to the
YOA is a first step toward the adoption of a justice model in juvenile
criminal law.
This development is not without controversy. Some commentators
feel that adult philosophies of justice are simply an inappropriate basis on
which to ground a juvenile justice system. They feel that, given the
special needs of young offenders and their special place in society, a
different model of sentencing is warranted. It is argued that principles
used in determining a just sentence in adult criminal law should not be
wholly applicable in determining the appropriate disposition in the
juvenile criminal context:
Criminal justice cannot be equated with retributive justice. Evolving
toward criminal justice does not mean that we are moving toward punish-
ment as such. In some of its variants, criminal justice can also aim at
rehabilitation and reinsertion in society and the person of the offender can
be accorded more importance than his crime32
23. Supra note 13 at 53.
24. Ibid.
25. Brodeur, supra note 16 at 113.
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II. The Dispositional Provisions of the YOA
In contradistinction to the Criminal Code, which provides little guidance
for sentencing of adult offenders, the YOA explicitly provides for a broad
range of dispositions26 and articulates a set of principles to be used in
imposing those dispositions.2 1 In this portion of the paper each of these
parts of the YOA will be discussed.
1. Dispositional Options under the YOA
While the Criminal Code focuses primarily on custodial sentences and
fines, the YOA provides a considerable variety of dispositions. Under
s. 20 of the YOA, a youth court can impose:
- an absolute discharge [paragraph (a)]
- fine not exceeding one thousand dollars [paragraph (b)]
- an order of compensation [paragraphs (c),(f)]
- an order of restitution [paragraphs (d),(e)]
- an order of community service [paragraph (g)]
- an order of prohibition [paragraph (h)]
- a treatment order (subject to consent) [paragraph (i)]
- an order of probation not exceeding two years [paragraph (j)]
- a custodial term [paragraphs (k), (k. 1)]
- other conditions [paragraph (1)]
S. 20(6) requires that the court provide written reasons for its disposi-
tions. S. 20(7) of the YOA states that no disposition under the YOA is to
be more severe than the maximum penalty which would be imposed
under the Criminal Code. At first glance one might take this to mean that
dispositions under the YOA are not as harsh as dispositions under the
Criminal Code. As far as the aftermath of a finding of guilt is concerned,
the general thrust of the YOA is to provide less severe consequences than
those for adult offenders under the Criminal Code.2 1 However, s. 20(7)
only states that a disposition under the YOA cannot be as harsh as the
maximum sentence available under the Criminal Code. In reality the
maximum sentence is almost never applied in adult sentencing.
Furthermore,
while adults are entitled to a number of mandatory and discretionary
remissions from sentence, a young offender is not. A two year sentence for
a young person means two years. In many respects, it is equivalent to a
6 year sentence for an adult, who can expect day parole in two years time.29
26. YOA, s. 20.
27. YOA, s. 3.
28. R.v.R.I. (1985), 17 C.C.C. (3d) 523 (Ont. C.A.).
29. R. v.J.A.G. (30 October 1992), 92-00691A (Terr. Ct. Y.).
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Thus it cannot truly be stated as a general proposition that young offender
dispositions are less severe than those available for adult offenders.
Bala points out that the most frequently used disposition under s. 20 is
the probation order with conditions." This disposition is extraordinarily
flexible and permits the court to tailor the nature of the order to the "needs
of the individual".
The breadth of options available to the youth court under s. 20 reflects
an attempt to avoid imposition of custodial terms if at all possible. Given
the uncertain effect of rehabilitative efforts, it is probably fair to assume
that, in enumerating such a broad array of dispositional tools under s. 20,
Parliament was acknowledging the criticism that sentencing in criminal
matters places too great an emphasis on incarceration to the exclusion of
other potential sanctions. This intention is confirmed by s. 24(1), which
permits custodial dispositions only when "necessary for the protection of
society having regard to the seriousness of the offence and the circum-
stances in which it was committed having regard to the needs and
circumstances of the young person".3 It has been suggested that institu-
tionalization is to be avoided wherever possible because of the negative
impact incarceration has on the individual.32 Custodial institutions can be
a source of negative influences for young persons who are in many cases
still very impressionable. Nevertheless this position is not without
controversy. There are those who feel that incarceration of young persons
is indeed necessary in order to ensure rehabilitation.33
Another condition precedent to the imposition of a custodial disposition
is found in s. 24(2). By virtue of that section a youth court cannot impose a
custodial disposition without first considering a pre-disposition report. The
purpose of a pre-disposition report is to ensure that the court is informed of
the current home environment of the young person and the history of the
young person in an effort to determine his or her amenability to rehabili-
tation. While at first glance it appears to be alaudable objective to ensure that
the court is well appraised as to the young person's history and circum-
stances, it must be noted that the actual effect of requiring pre-disposition
reports is to encourage and support the imposition of custodial dispositions.
Often youth courts will impose a custodial disposition in order to remove the
young person from a negative home environment which has been brought to
the court's attention through the pre-disposition report.
30. Supra note 2 at 28.
31. YOA, s. 24(1).
32. R. Dawson, "The Future of Juvenile Justice: Is it Time to Abolish the System?" (1990)
80 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 136.
33. G. Grissom, "Dispositional Authority and the Future of the Juvenile Justice System"
(1991) 42(4) Juvenile & Family Court Journal 25 at 25.
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Even if one goes so far as to say that "custody is to be imposed only
when all else fails",34 it is clear that at some point concerns other than the
absolute welfare of the child must be taken into consideration. When a
serious and violent crime has been committed, the public will demand a
serious sanction be imposed, and moreover the offender and those like
him or her must be shown that young people who commit acts of serious
violence will be held accountable .3 The YOA therefore provides for
custodial dispositions of up to two years,36 and for dispositions of up to
three years in custody for those offences which are punishable by life
imprisonment under the Criminal Code.
37
There have been a number of significant criticisms of the YOA's
dispositional provisions. First, academics have criticized the somewhat
unclear distinction between secure and open custody in s. 24.1 (1). Since
custodial institutions are administered provincially there is a marked
disparity in quality and availability of facilities from province to province
and municipality to municipality. The result has been regional disparity
in the length and severity of dispositions under the YOA.35 Moreover,
some academics have argued that the differentiation between secure and
open custody has been used by youth courts as a "middle option"; a
justification for imposing custodial terms where they would not previ-
ously have been imposed. It is argued that s. 24.1 has therefore had a
punitive impact on dispositional practices.39 S. 24(1) requires that custo-
dial dispositions only be imposed "when necessary for the protection of
society ... having regard to the needs and circumstances of the young
person." This was to be an additional requirement to be met before a
custodial disposition was imposed. It has become clear, however, that
s. 24(1) has not made it more difficult to impose a custodial disposition.
Courts have used the words "having regard to the needs and circum-
stances of the young person" to argue that where the child is in need of
guidance which is not available in his or her family environment a
custodial term is required.4 °
S. 20 also fails to deal with a very real problem that youth courts face
in wading through the available dispositions: the lack of institutional
34. R.v.R.C.S. (1986), 27 C.C.C. (3d) 239 (N.B.C.A.).
35. YOA, s. 3 (1) (a).
36. YOA, s. 20(l)(k)(i).
37. YOA, s. 20(1)(k)(ii).
38. A. Doob, "Trends in the Use of Custodial Dispositions for Young Offenders" (1992) 34
Can. J. Crim. 75.
39. Bala, supra note 2 at 29.
40. See R. v. KL.B. (1985), 67 N.S.R. (2d) 232 (C.A.); R. v. R.G.M. (1987), 79 N.S.R. (2d)
144 (C.A.).
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resources which exists in most if not all jurisdictions. While a youth court
judge might think it preferable to place an offender on probation on the
condition that he or she live in a group home, there may simply be no
space available in the home. The judge may be led to the conclusion that
there is no choice but to order a custodial disposition.
2. Declaration of Principle
In imposing a disposition under s. 20 of the YOA, courts are to have regard
to s. 3, which enumerates a set of principles which are to be used in
interpreting and applying that statute. This section has been interpreted
to have the force of a substantive provision and not merely a descriptive
preamble.4' Briefly stated, s. 3(1) povides that the following principles
are to be considered in arriving at dispositions for young offenders:
- (limited) accountability and responsibility [paragraph (a)]
- protection of society [paragraph (b)]
- needs of the young offender [paragraph (c)]
- rights of the young person [paragraph (e)]
- least possible interference [paragraph (f)]
- parental responsibility [paragraph (h)]
There is no question that all of these principles are valid and essential
factors necessary for arriving at sound dispositions for young offenders.
The fundamental problem, however, is that these principles are not
prioritized in any way, and as a result the courts have been given no
direction or starting point upon which to structure their decision-making
process. The problem is described aptly by Doob and Beaulieu:
The YOA lists a number of different principles that are to guide dispositions
under theAct but does not give precedence to any single principle, nor does
it indicate how much weight should be given to any one principle.42
The problem is compounded by the fact that the principles in s. 3 often
involve contradictory considerations. Unlike the JDA, which considered
the protection of society and the interests of the juvenile to be substan-
tially similar, the YOA is based upon a philosophy which views these two
principles as fundamentally at odds with each other. The protection of
society, which has been interpreted to include general deterrence,
43
specific deterrence and incapacitation, 44 often conflicts with the "needs
41. R v. V.(T.), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 749.
42. A. Doob and L. Beaulieu, "Variation in the Exercise of Judicial Discretion with Young
Offenders" (1992) 34 Can. J. Crim. 35, at 42.
43. R. v. M.J.C. (1985), 22 C.C.C. (3d) 95 (Sask. C.A.). But see R. v. C.W.W. (1986), 25
C.C.C. (3d) 355 (Alta. C.A.).
44. R. v. C.WI., ibid.
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of the young offender", which has been interpreted on various occasions
to include rehabilitation.
45
A particularly striking example of the clash between these two prin-
ciples is the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in R. v. H.(A.).
4
1
In that case, a young offender involved in a gang altercation stabbed
another young person. The victim was seriously and permanently inca-
pacitated and left virtually unemployable. At trial, the offender was given
a two-year term of secure custody, but on appeal evidence was adduced
showing that he was reacting negatively to custody. His behaviour had
become more and more antisocial since he had been incarcerated, and he
was increasingly bitter. The disposition was varied to time served (eight
months). In dissenting, Locke J.A. pointed out that the Court was required
here to "squarely face the dilemma between protecting society and
rehabilitation."'47 In this case the crime was serious and violent and called
for a harsh disposition, but placing the offender in a custodial institution
clearly had a negative effect on him personally.
The result is probably best described by Markwart and Corrado:
This Declaration is, in fact, a set of eight propositions that are not
prioritized, are often qualified and consequently unclear, and often seem
incompatible with one another.
48
There are a number of unfortunate side effects of this failure to rank the
principles in s. 3. First, permitting courts to pick and choose among
mutually incompatible principles of sentencing will result in consider-
able variance in the severity of dispositions in like cases. Doob, in a
survey of statistical studies of the impact of the YOA on dispositional
practices, concludes that the lack of clarity in the declaration of principles
is one of four factors contributing to variance in the severity of disposi-
tions under the Act 49
More compelling data indicating that the lack of prioritization of the
principles in s. 3 causes variation are found in an independent survey
conducted by Doob and Beaulieu.50 In that survey 43 judges experienced
in dealing with youth court dispositions were given four fact patterns and
asked to determine dispositions and provide reasons for their determina-
tions. The results were indicative of a lack of consensus among judges
45. R.v.H.(S.R.) (1990), 56 C.C.C. (3d) 46 (Ont. C.A.).
46. (1991), 65 C.C.C. (3d) 119 [hereinafter R. v. A.H.]
47. Ibid, at 121.
48. Supra note 12 at 15.
49. Supra note 38. Doob acknowledges that it is impossible to isolate the statistical
significance of each of the factors contributing to variance in light of the marked variation in
resources, prosecuting policies, and enforcement practices between and within provinces.
50. Supra note 42.
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with respect to the goals to be emphasized in determining the disposition
for any of the cases. There was a significant variation in the severity of
dispositions handed down. Doob and Beaulieu concluded:
The variation in dispositions that we have shown... can be understood as
being a direct result of the Young Offenders Act itself.5 t
A second consequence of the ambiguity in s. 3 is that it has resulted in
a greater degree of overall interference with the liberty of young offenders
than was the case under the JDA. This is because courts with an
inclination toward custodial dispositions can draw on and give para-
mountcy to the principle under s. 3 which best suits their cause. In order
to support a severe custodial term with reference to a serious offence, the
court will give primacy to the protection of society. In order to support a
custodial disposition for a relatively minor offence, the courts will
emphasize the needs of the young offender and argue that the offender
needs to be placed in custody in order to be treated.
A third effect of the lack of clarity in s. 3 is the irrationality that such
an ambiguous declaration perpetuates. The result is an erosion of the
deterrent effect of dispositions. When penalties are not imposed ratio-
nally and consistently, the connection between the commission of the
offence and the penalty is lost. The result is a failure to bring home to
young people the fact that their contraventions will lead to punishment.
In Tr6panier's words, courts should "aim at general deterrence ... by
regular and constant imposition of fair punishments". 2 Thus while
custodial dispositions may be handed down more frequently than was the
case under the JDA, there is no guarantee that this increase will result in
increased general deterrence.
Having assessed the effects of the ambiguity in the declaration of
principle, it is next necessary to ask why Parliament did not prioritize or
rank the principles in s. 3. There are two possible explanations for the lack
of clarity and prioritization in the declaration of principle: (1) the need for
individualization and judicial discretion in dispositions, and (2) the fact
that legislative ambivalence is simply areflection of societal ambivalence.
First, the lack of prioritization in s. 3 is often explained as an attempt
by Parliament to leave dispositional discretion in the hands of courts. It
is contended that courts should not be bound or limited by any particular
abstract principle in arriving at the appropriate disposition in particular
situations. Legislation, it is argued, cannot account for the particular
circumstances in which the offence was committed, nor can it accommo-
date the particular needs of the individual:
51. Ibid. at 49.
52. Supra note 4 at 49.
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Mostjudges appear to take the view that there is no need to change section
3 of the YOA. They see it as an improvement over the JDA, indicating that
it gives judges the scope to deal with almost any case. 3
This is the view of the Alberta Court of Appeal. In R. v. C. W. W. that court
stated that it is "improper to attempt to express a starting point for
offences involving young offenders because the Act contemplates a very
significant degree of individualization."54 This opinion assumes that
limiting youth court discretion will render youth court judges unable to
tailor their sentences to the needs of individual young offenders. It must
be recognized that pointing youth court discretion in a certain direction
is not the same thing as removing the discretion altogether. Prioritizing
the principles in s. 3 would simply give the courts an indication of the
"dimensions to be used in individualizing the sentence. 55
It would be useful, at this point, to state the obvious: the YOA cannot
rehabilitate all young offenders, nor can it eliminate all crime among
youth. It is one of many tools to be used in grappling with the problem of
youth crime, and itis necessary that youth courts recognize this. Doob and
Beaulieu submit that
judges, within the context of a single disposition, are attempting to
accomplish an enormous amount.... [Our survey] suggests that judges
have set themselves an almost impossible task: combining almost contra-
dictory goals to arrive at a disposition.5
6
Thus, while many youth court judges would assert that the declaration of
principle in s. 3 is an exemplary means of achieving the degree of
discretion necessary in sentencing young offenders, a survey of youth
court practice leads to the conclusion that the ultimate goal will vary from
disposition to disposition. What is the overall purpose of handing down
a disposition under the YOA? What is the role of the YOA in dealing with
youth crime? It is submitted that a rational approach to interpretation of
s. 3 must be identified, in turn leading to a rational and consistent
application of the YOA's substantive dispositional provisions.
Secondly, there are those who contend that the ambiguity in the
declaration of principle is a result of a general legislative ambivalence
regarding the purposes of juvenile penal sentencing. It is difficult to
determine whether the structure of the YOA is an attempt to permit broad
judicial discretion or simply an act of avoidance or an overt intention "to
53. A. Doob, "Dispositions Under the Young Offenders Act: Issues Without Answers" in
L.Beaulieu, ed., supra note 4, 193 at 202 [hereinafter "Dispositions"].
54. (1986), 25 C.C.C. (3d) 355, at 359.
55. "Dispositions", supra note 53, at 204.
56. Supra note 42.
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dump the problem on the courts."57 The YOA has been praised by some
as a "courageous attempt to balance concepts and interests that are
frequently conflicting."5 The position expounded by those who praise
the lack of specificity in s. 3 is that there is simply no single philosophy
which will accommodate all the types of offenders. The ambivalence in
the YOA is a reflection of the societal ambivalence regarding the objec-
tives of juvenile penal law. Beaton argues that the public wants emphasis
placed on protection of society for what it perceives as criminal conduct
and emphasis on the needs of the individual in disposing of cases which
it perceives to be mere adolescent rebelliousness.
59
It is submitted, however, that the Act is anything but courageous in its
attempt to deal with the various competing views of juvenile justice.
Parliament simply threw all of its concerns together in s. 3 without
making any tough decisions about which concerns should be given
preeminence. The way s. 3 is structured, in combination with the way that
it is interpreted, has led to disparity and irrationality in dispositional
practices.
11. Traditional Goals of Adult Sentencing Employed
in the Young Offender Context
The only proposition which can be stated with any degree of certainty is
that considerations applicable in adult sentencing are not to be applied
without modification to young offenders. 0 The extent to which the five
traditional objectives used in adult sentencing-general deterrence,
specific deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution-are
applicable to young offenders is unclear. In 1986 the New Brunswick
Court of Appeal was of the opinion that objectives used in adult sentenc-
ing are wholly inapplicable in determining young offender dispositions.
6'
Nevertheless the better view, which appears to have been recently
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada, is that adult sentencing
objectives may be drawn upon in youth courts, but are of limited
usefulness. 62 What this means in practice is unclear, but the point is well
taken that traditional sentencing objectives were developed in reference
57. "Dispositions", supra note 53 at 202.
58. J.J L, supra note 15 at491.
59. M. Beaton, "The Young Offenders Act: Between a Rock and a Hard Place" (1993) 42
U.N.B.LJ. 295.
60. J.J.M., supra note 15.
61. R. v.R.C.S., supra note 34.
62. J.J.JL, supra note 15.
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to a different penal philosophy and therefore should be applied with
caution.63
Before looking at the judicial treatment of each of the traditional
objectives individually, an attempt must be made to place judicial
interpretations of the YOA in their proper context. First, appellate court
opinions on the usefulness of adult sentencing objectives in young
offender dispositions are far from uniform; the state of the law differs
significantly from province to province. The Supreme Court of Canada
has done little to alleviate the disparity in philosophical approaches to
young offender dispositions. The Court's recent ruling in J.J.M. con-
dones the ambivalent and unrestrictive approach taken by Parliament in
the YOA's Declaration of Principle.'
Secondly, insofar as there has been any consistent and meaningful
consensus on the overall philosophy of the YOA, there appear to have
been two distinct periods in the interpretation of theAct. As Young points
out in his survey of appellate court pronouncements on young offender
sentencing, early decisions emphasized differences between the YOA and
the JDA.65 By focusing on the "rights and responsibilities" which the YOA
created, youth courts saw the YOA as a rejection of the treatment/welfare
approach which existed under the JDA.66 Corrado and Markwart con-
cluded that, initially at least, the Young Offenders Act was more punitive
than the JDA.67 During this period some appellate courts handed down
decisions which, at least in certain circumstances, condoned the practice
of giving paramountcy to the seriousness of the crime over the needs of
the young offender.6"
Since the late 1980's, however, appellate courts have tended to view
the YOA as occupying the middle ground between the treatment/welfare
orientation of the JDA and the justice orientation of the Criminal Code.
69
The result has been a general reluctance to place concerns for the
protection of society and the seriousness of the offence above concerns
for the rehabilitative needs of the young offender,70 and an apparent return
63. R. v. R.L, supra note 28.
64. Supra note 15.
65. A. Young, "Appellate Court Sentencing Principles for Young Offenders" in L. Beaulieu,
ed., supra note 4, 67 at 67.
66. See e.g. R. v. D.O.C. (1987), 58 Sask. R. 238 (C.A.).
67. Supra note 12.
68. See R. v. M.J.C., supra note 43. See also R. v. M.Y.W. (1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 328
(B.C.C.A.).
69. J.J.M., supra note 15.
70. SeeR. v. Q.D., [1990] R.J.Q. 1506 (Ct. Qu6.). See alsoR. v.M.(E.) (1992), 76 C.C.C. (3d)
159 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter R. v. E.M.].
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to the interventionist and paternalistic sentencing practices commonly
found under JDA jurisprudence.
1. Retribution and Proportionality
Retribution is a central objective in adult sentencing. Retribution has
been condemned by some as a barbaric need for society to exact
vengeance on the criminal. But such a condemnation ignores the fact that
retribution is an attempt to vindicate the indignation that society has
suffered at the hands of the criminal. More importantly, retribution
ensures that the state does not disregard the dignity of the offender. If
there were no moral constraints on the severity of interference with the
offender, utilitarian punishment objectives such as deterrence or rehabili-
tation would permit the state to ignore the dignity of the offender in order
to achieve broader societal objectives. In short, retribution leads to
proportionality, which is the essential basis for the intervention of the
state in a "justice model" of criminal law. This paper therefore proceeds
on the assumption that deviations from the principle of proportionality on
the basis of some utilitarian objective of sentencing are very difficult to
justify morally.
Given the young person's limited understanding of responsibility, lack
of development, and need for guidance, our society acknowledges that
the just sentence for the adult offender is not necessarily the same as the
just disposition for the young offender.
Criminal justice cannot be equated with retributive justice. Evolving
toward criminal justice does not mean that we are moving toward punish-
ment as such. In some of its variants, criminal justice can also aim at
rehabilitation and reinsertion in society and the person of the offender can
be accorded more importance than his crime.7
This is affirmed by the YOA's Declaration of Principle, which specifies
that young persons are to be held accountable only in a limited sense
(paragraph (a)) and that young persons have special needs (paragraphs (c)
and (f)). Thus, dispositions under the YOA may deviate from the principle
of proportionality where consistent with the needs of the young offender.
It is thus generally accepted that proportionality is a less central concept
in young offender sentencing than it is with respect to adult offenders .
72
In R. v. R.I., the Ontario Court of Appeal stated:
The close correlation which is generally looked to as appropriate in the
case of an adult offender, between the seriousness of the offence and the
71. Brodeur, supra note 16 at 113.
72. J.J.M., supra note 15.
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length of the sentence imposed for it, may or may not be equally as
appropriate in the case of a young offender.73
The problem, as is demonstrated below, is that the "needs of the young
offender" have been interpreted to include the "need" to be incarcerated
in order to facilitate rehabilitation. This interpretation is by no means
demanded by the YOA itself. The Declaration should have been inter-
preted to implicitly limit departures from proportionality. Given the
emphasis placed on the rights of the young person in paragraph (e), the
inclusion of the principle of least interference in paragraph (f), and the
recognition of parental responsibility in paragraph (h), the YOA should be
interpreted so as not to permit deviations from proportionality which
would permit a more onerous disposition than would otherwise be the
case. The mixed model ofjustice which the YOA represents should allow
the court to reduce the severity of a disposition. It should not allow the
court to increase the severity of dispositions, either in the interests of the
protection of society or in the interests of the needs of the young offender.
The principle of least interference should preclude more onerous dispo-
sitions. Moreover, the role of the parents should not be usurped by the
state through the criminal law. The best way to deal with concern over the
adequacy of parental supervision is through family law and provincial
child protection legislation.
There is a further point which must be made about the application of
the proportionality principle in young offender dispositions. An argu-
ment that proportionality should be the guiding principle in young
offender dispositions should not be taken as an argument that all dispo-
sitions in the young offender context should be proportionate in some
concrete sense to sentences for similar offences in the adult context. Strict
numerical comparisons of sentences in adult and young offender matters
are wholly inappropriate given the limited severity of dispositions under
the YOA. "While proportionality is clearly a consideration, the temptation
to give it a numerical expression [in relation to a similar offence in the
adult context] must be avoided.
74
2. General and Specific Deterrence
It could be argued that references to the protection of society in s. 3(l)(b)
and in s. 24(1) include the objective of general deterrence. With the
exception of the Alberta Court of Appeal,75 there is judicial support for
73. (1985), 17 C.C.C. (3d) 523.
74. R.v.C.D.N. (1990), 100 N.S.R. (2d) 4 (C.A.).
75. R. v. C.W.W., supra note 43.
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this interpretation. 76 That the protection of society includes the objective
of general deterrence has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in J.J.M.
In that case Cory J. opined that, in theory, the deterrent effect of
dispositions in young offender cases should be effective because a large
proportion of juvenile delinquency is the result of "group activity". 7
Initially there was concern among academics that, in observing the
significant change in philosophy from the JDA to the YOA, courts were
giving paramount weight to the protection of society and consequently
had been focusing on the objective of deterrence in sentencing to the
exclusion of other principles." But it has become clear, in light of
numerous appellate court pronouncements, that this is no longer the case.
In determining dispositions for young offenders the courts have consis-
tently subordinated the objective of general deterrence to other goals.79
For example, in R. v. S.R.H., two young offenders were convicted of
manslaughter for killing an old man. The young offenders were intoxi-
cated at the time. The trial judge imposed a term of open custody on both.
At the Ontario Court of Appeal it was accepted that in light of the
seriousness of the crime the proper disposition would have been a term
of secure custody, but the disposition was not disturbed because there was
evidence that the two offenders were "doing well" in open custodyo
There is an abundance of literature which questions the efficacy of
imposing harsh custodial terms in order to deter the general population
from committing crime. It is well beyond the scope of this paper to
evaluate the merit of any such criticisms. It is nevertheless necessary to
state that the deterrent effect of dispositions is far from certain, 81 and this
is a relevant factor in determining dispositions under the YOA. Conse-
quently, deterrence alone cannot be a valid moral basis upon which to
remove the freedom of the individual. It is submitted that the use of
disproportionately harsh sentences in order to deter others is a strategy
which should be impermissible in young offender dispositions, given the
explicit recognition in the legislation of principles such as accountability
and least interference. In the words of Trdpanier:
76. See R. v. M.J.C., supra note 43; R. v. F.IG.C. (1986), 81 N.S.R. (2d) 82 (C.A.).
77. Supra note 15 at 496.
78. See Corrado and Markwart, supra note 12.
79. See R. v. E.M., supra note 70; R. v. A.H., supra note 46; R. v. C.J.L (1986), 29 C.C.C.
(3d) 123 (Nfld.C.A.).
80. Supra note 45.
81. Report of the Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reform, A Canadian
Approach (1987).
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A judge is not a legislator. Contrary to the latter who, when he makes
legislative choices, makes decisions that apply to all citizens, ajudge's role
is to make decisions that concern individual cases. 2
The deterrent effect of sentences should be derived from the system as a
whole, not from exemplary dispositions in particular circumstances. The
preferred way to deter society in general from committing crimes is to
demonstrate that criminal conduct, when detected, will be sanctioned on
a rational and consistent basis, in proportion to the wrong which has been
committed.
In sentencing young offenders the courts appear to be more comfort-
able with the use of specific deterrence than with general deterrence.83
This is probably because specific deterrence is more amenable to a
paternalistic outlook than is general deterrence. It can be argued-and
often is-that the "needs of the young person" require that he or she be
deterred, in his or her individual capacity, from criminal conduct.
8 4
Again, it is submitted that the use of disproportionately severe sanc-
tions in an effort to show the young offender that his or her contraventions
will result in a significant curtailment of personal liberty should be
discouraged. Any individual deterrence which can be derived from the
penal sanction should be the result of a just form of punishment, and not
the reason for imposing the punishment.
3. Incapacitation
Incapacitation has received judicial approval as a proper consideration in
young offender dispositions. Since any custodial disposition removes
the offender from society, the disposition is a form of incapacitation. But
as a primary objective of dispositions, incapacitation does not provide an
adequate moral basis upon which to support a penal sanction in the
context of juvenile justice. In the case of adult offenders who pose a
serious threat to society, the state might well be justified in imposing a
custodial sentence of significant duration based on incapacitation. But in
the case of young offenders who have markedly better opportunities to be
re-integrated into society,86 who have their whole lives ahead of them, and
the most threatening and violent of whom will be transferred to adult
courts, it is inappropriate to use incapacitation as a primary objective of
sentencing. Given the fact that s. 3 of the YOA espouses the principles of
82. Supra note 4 at 48.
83. R. v. C.W.W., supra note 43; R.G.M. v. R., supra note 40.
84. R. v. F.O. (1986), 16 O.A.C. 358.
85. R. v. C.W.W., supra note 43 at 358.
86. See Young, supra note 65 at 71.
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limited accountability and least interference, the YOA should be inter-
preted in such a manner that the interests of juvenile offenders are not
subordinated to the interests of society. It is submitted that incapacitation
should be relegated to the role of an incidental result of the rational
imposition of proportional dispositions.
4. Rehabilitation
The objective of rehabilitation can easily be derived from the reference
to the "needs of the young offender" in paragraph (c) of the YOA's
Declaration of Principle. Courts have given rehabilitative objectives
significant weight in the context of young offender dispositions. In R. v.
E.M., Abella J.A. was of the opinion that rehabilitative concerns should
take precedence over all others in sentencing young offenders.
While these guiding principles in section 3 appear to reflect a philosophi-
cal and cautious balancing between offender and offence and between
deterrence and rehabilitation, read as a whole they none the less call for the
determinative emphasis to be on the remedial, rehabilitative and prospec-
tive needs of the young offender.87
There are generally two manifestations of rehabilitative objectives in
young offender dispositions. First, youth courts have on numerous
occasions given priority to rehabilitative concerns in order to arrive at a
disposition that is less onerous than would otherwise have been the case.
This is done by giving determinative weight to the "needs of the young
person" in spite of acontradictory concern forthe "protection ofsociety".ss
Such a deviation from the principle of proportionality may be permis-
sible in light of the special position of young people, especially when the
choice is between a non-custodial and a custodial term. Custodial
institutions are a concentrated source of bad influences and negative
socialization for young people, and can have significant impact on the
character development of adolescents s9 This position is not without
controversy. There are those who argue that efforts at rehabilitation have
significant impact on recidivism.9° Nevertheless, given the uncertain
effects of rehabilitative measures, it is submitted that where two or more
courses of action are available to the court in handing down a disposition
to a young offender, the option which represents the least intrusion on the
liberty of the young person should be adopted (in the absence of evidence
87. Supra note 70 at 169.
88. See R. v. H.A., supra note 46; R. v. C.J.L, supra note 79.
89. Dawson, supra note 32.
90. Grissom, supra note 33.
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that rehabilitation might be effective in the particular young offender's
case).
It is valid to assume (though it is by no means explicitly stated) that in
passing the YOA Parliament made a conscious decision to deviate from
the principle of proportionality where it conflicts directly with the
interests of the young person. The drafters, in creating a "mixed model"
of juvenile criminal justice, have made a statement that our society will
forego some of the punitive and retributive impact of dispositions in order
to assure that young people, who represent the future of our society, are
given adequate opportunity to be reintegrated.
The second way in which courts have used rehabilitative objectives in
young offender dispositions is to justify imposing more severe disposi-
tions or more lengthy custodial terms on offenders who they perceive to
be in need of treatment, guidance, and/or a more stable environment. 91 In
R. v. K.L.B., the Appeal Division of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court
affirmed a lengthy custodial disposition for a first time offender who was
perceived to be "out of control" and in need of guidance which could not
be adequately provided at home.
92
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have
given its approval to this approach. In J.J.M., a lengthy custodial
disposition based primarily on the fact that the offender's family environ-
ment involved alcoholism, domestic violence, and the negative influ-
ences of other siblings was upheld on appeal. The appellant argued that
the YOA required the sentence to be proportional to the offence commit-
ted. In response, Cory J. ruled that
[fior the young person, a proper disposition must take into account not only
the seriousness of the crime, but also all other relevant factors.93
The factors taken into consideration in J.J.M.'s case were his home
situation and his lack of guidance which were "indicative of the need for
care [custody]".
It is clear that the courts, in viewing the YOA as a mixed model which
includes elements of both the treatment model andthejustice model, have
decided that the YOA permits paternalistic intervention. Our society, they
argue, will permit more intrusive state action in respect of its young
people than it will permit in respect of its adult citizens. Children are not
considered to have absolute liberty; their liberty is curtailed by parental
guidance until such time as they have acquired a certain level of maturity
and responsibility. Thus in handing down dispositions under the YOA, the
91. SeeR. v.R.L, supranote 28.
92. Supra note 40.
93. Supra note 15 at 494.
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state should be permitted to intervene on the basis of paternalism where
it is clear that a young person's home life is not providing adequate
guidance and control. The author submits, however, that the proper
means of dealing with children who are in need of more stable family
environments and are subject to abuse in the home is through provincial
family law and welfare legislation. Provincial statutes such as Nova
Scotia's Children and Family Services Act have specific provisions for
removing children from abusive home situations.
94
The criminal sanction should not be used as a tool in the welfare
system. This was one of the fundamental reasons for the transition from
the JDA to the YOA. Young points out that [t]his practice appears to
contradict the strong and resolute appellate pronouncements that custo-
dial sanctions are not to be used as a substitute for either welfare problems
or mental health problems.95 For example, in R. v. R.L, the Ontario Court
of Appeal stated:
The fact that this young offender may require some long term form of
social or institutional care or guidance if there is any real prospect of
rehabilitation does not mean that the vehicle of the YOA can be employed
forthat purpose. Here, as under the Criminal Code, it is acardinal principle
that, within the limits prescribed by Parliament, the punishment should fit
the crime but should not be stretched so that it exceeds it.
96
Similarly, in R. v. M.B., a severe custodial disposition handed down to a
young offender was reduced by the Ontario Court of Appeal because it
was "chosen to get him out of the community in which he was brought
up." 97 In R. v. E.B. it was made clear that a custodial disposition under the
YOA was not to be treated as a substitute for wardship.9S
Tr~panier is of the opinion that "whereas the JDA permitted increasing
the degree of intervention according to the needs of the child, the YOA
does not."99 This would appear to be a reasonable interpretation given that
the former model made little distinction between provincial child welfare
systems and the juvenile criminal system, while the latter clearly reflects
an attempt to sever the two systems. Nevertheless, it is evident from
J.J.M. 100 that this interpretation has not found favour with the Supreme
Court of Canada. In that case it was determined that the rehabilitative
needs of the young offender required a significant custodial term, in part
due to the negative influences of a poor home environment.
94. S.N.S. 1990, c.5, s.100.
95. Supra note 65 at 93.
96. Supra note 28.
97. (1987), 36 C.C.C. (3d) 573.
98. (1987), 78 A.R. 280 (C.A.).
99. Supra note 4 at 34.
100. Supra note 15.
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5. Conclusion
It is thus concluded that the dispositional regime under the YOA has been
interpreted as part of a mixed model of juvenile criminal law in which
both 'justice" and "treatment" objectives are permitted. The law permits
disproportionate dispositions in two circumstances: (1) where the devia-
tion is based on the principle of least interference, and (2) where the
deviation is based on a paternalistic assessment of the "needs" of the
young offender. This paper has concluded that the state does not have the
moral authority to intervene into the liberty of a young person through the
criminal law when that intervention is based on paternalism. The next
section will attempt to identify some potential reforms which could help
to advance the evolution of sentencing practice for young persons in
Canada.
IV. Potential Reform
There are academics who feel that, given the convergence of philosophi-
cal approaches to adult law and young offender legislation, the only
means of maintaining any valid distinction at all is through different
dispositional practices.' 10 In making the move from the JDA to the YOA,
however, Parliament has taken a step toward the adoption of an unadul-
terated justice philosophy in young offender dispositions. Viewed as part
of a larger movement across North America, the YOA can be considered
as only one step in a number of steps toward justice-based dispositional
philosophy in young offender legislation. But given the variance in
dispositions under the YOA, the lack of a rational system for determining
dispositions, and the sporadic use of disproportionate dispositions, it is
apparent that there must be some more specific form of guidance than
currently exists with respect to young offender dispositions in Canada.
A frequently cited example of the justice model of young offender
sentencing is the Washington State Juvenile Justice Act. In the words of
one commentator:
The changes in Washington's code reflect the principles held by modem
day advocates of a "just deserts" or "justice" model for the legal system...
[which emphasizes] uniformity, equity, fairness, and accountability rather
than rehabilitation or deterrence.
10 2
The Washington State scheme is similar to the YOA in that it has as its
main objectives the protection of the public, the accountability of young
persons, and concern for the needs of the young person. The Washington
101. Young, supra note 65.
102. Schneider and Schram, supra note 22 at 213.
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State model differs from the YOA, however, in that it makes a clear choice
to emphasize thejustice-oriented components of the model at the expense
of the treatment-oriented components. To borrow the phraseology of the
Alberta Court of Appeal in R. v. C. W. W., the legislation "expresses a
starting point". 1 3 According to Manfredi the third of the above objec-
tives, the accommodation of the needs of the young person,
is the least important, since treatment needs are not used by the commis-
sion as a variable in determining the length of sentences. Juveniles who
might benefit from additional rehabilitative services after completing their
dispositions are encouraged to continue... voluntarily. 104
The reform suggestions presented in this paper will be based partly on the
Washington State model. The Washington model was selected for
comparative analysis because it is generally considered to be the most
distinctly justice-oriented piece of legislation in juvenile criminal law in
North America at this time.15 It must be noted that the judicial preference
for interventionist sentencing tactics and unlimited judicial discretion in
Canada would probably require that any reforms to the YOA be instituted
through significant modification to the statute itself.
It is submitted that young offender dispositions be based primarily
upon the principle of proportionality between the seriousness of the
offence committed and the seriousness of the concomitant state sanction.
If this means that young offender dispositions are determined in a manner
which is substantially similar to the way in which adult sentences are
determined, so be it. There are certainly factors which will distinguish
young offender dispositions from adult sentences: young offender dispo-
sitions will be less onerous, and deviations from proportionality in order
to accommodate the needs of the young offender will be easier to justify.
Doob points out that dispositional guidance may take the form of either
abstract or concrete guidelines. 10 6 The Declaration of Principle has served
as a form of abstract guidance for youth courts, but it is apparent that in
its current form s. 3 is insufficient. Nevertheless, simply ranking the
principles in s. 3 would probably not be sufficient to provide the direction
needed. Brodeur is of the opinion that while a Declaration of Principle is
necessary, it is of limited usefulness because the legislation itself simply
cannot accommodate all of the contingencies of offence and offender.10 7
Concrete guidance is simply an attempt to specify a particular range of
103. Supra note 44.
104. Supra note 13.
105. Ibid.
106. "Dispositions", supra note 53 at 201.
107. Supra note 16 at 109.
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dispositions which would be appropriate under a particular set of circum-
stances. Concrete guidance in adult sentencing often takes the form of
tariff sentencing. Washington's Juvenile Justice Act includes abstract
guidance in the form of a legislative statement of intention which is
supplemented by concrete guidance in the form of sentencing guidelines
which are approved by the legislature.
Concrete guidance would require a method of determining the appro-
priate range of dispositions for each type of offence and set of circum-
stances. The Washington example based its concrete range of disposition
on a "points system" which assigned numerical values to the severity of
the offence, the recency and severity of prior offences committed by the
offender, and the age of the offender. Each offender was given a "score"
which was then used to determine the range of sentence which to be
imposed. This is perhaps a somewhat contrived and rigid mode of
classification of sentences. A more liberal range of presumptive sen-
tences in combination with a more general mode of classifying the
severity of dispositions would be preferable. This would permit youth
courts to exercise some degree of factual and contextual discretion in
applying the guidelines.
It must also be pointed out that there is no need to require that all
dispositions for a given offence fall within the determined range. The
established range should only be viewed as a starting point, which would
presumptively apply. In the Washington State model, the guidelines
apply presumptively and can be varied up or down if the judge provides
written reasons demonstrating the "manifest injustice" which would
result from adhering to the presumptive sentence. The Washington State
model is arguably too rigid in this respect given that the "manifest
injustice" standard has been used very sparingly. 03 While this standard
would undoubtedly encourage certainty and uniformity it is submitted
that it might be unduly difficult to vary the disposition downward when
consistent with the needs of the young person. As was stated in part three
of this paper, the principle of least interference in combination with the
desire to maintain some accommodation for the needs of the young
offender could be used to permit a deviation from the presumptive
guideline where that deviation would represent a lesser interference with
the liberty of the young person.
It is also necessary to consider the appropriate forum for establishing
dispositional guidelines. As Brodeur points out, appellate courts are
probably not well suited to this task given the fact that they deal only with
exceptional circumstances, and that they deal primarily with errors in
108. Schneider and Schram, supra note 22.
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principle (abstract guidance) and only incidentally deal with actual
dispositions (concrete guidance). 19 This approach is affirmed by Locke
J.A. in R. v. H.A.Y° Brodeur concludes that the most effective way to
develop a set of presumptive guidelines which would be adequately
consulted on a regular basis is through the establishment of an indepen-
dent sentencing commission. This is the approach taken in Washington,
where a nine member Commission establishes guidelines which are then
approved by the legislature.'
The overall effects of the Washington State model were assessed by
Schneider and Schram in 1986, eight years after the introduction of the
Juvenile Justice Act.' 2 They concluded that there was a significantly
greater degree of proportionality between the severity of the offence
committed and the severity of the sanction imposed in the post-reform
period (as one should expect from a mode predicated on proportionality).
Moreover, sentences under the reformed legislation were generally less
severe, while at the same time offenders were more certain to receive
some form of sanction for committing a crime than in the pre-reform era.
The result, in logic, would be an increase in the general deterrent value
of the law. Dispositions were also more uniform: like cases were more
likely to receive like sentences in the post-reform era.
The overall effect of the reforms was thus determined to be positive,
though this conclusion was by no means unanimous. There was no
possible way to determine the law's effect on rates of recidivism because
the procedural impact of the reform package introduced too many new
variables. This will undoubtedly prove to be a major area of contention
in future debate over the usefulness of the Juvenile JusticeAct, since those
in favour of a rehabilitation-based model would argue that this should be
the focus of juvenile criminal law. Moreover, judges were extremely
unhappy with the new legislation because it removes almost all discretion
they have in handing down sentences. This is probably a result of the fact
that young offenders are classified on the basis of a points system which
does not leave any factual or contextual discretion.
What does this mean for potential YOA reforms? This paper concludes
that the juvenile criminal law in Canada could benefit significantly from
increased certainty and uniformity in dispositions. A more rigid set of
principles in s. 3 of the YOA specifically removing from the court the
opportunity to exercise any degree of paternalism, in combination with a
109. Brodeur, supra note 16 at 107.
110. Supranote46.
111. Manfredi, supra footnote 13.
112. Supra note 102.
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set of concrete guidelines (possibly in the form of regulations), are
recommended. It is acknowledged that the likelihood of seeing such
drastic change to the YOA in the recent future is unlikely given that the
transition from the JDA to the YOA occurred less than ten years ago.
Nevertheless, viewed in the context of a larger movement toward justice-
orientation in juvenile criminal law across North America, it is submitted
that such changes are inevitable.
